UIC Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 2

Article 1

Winter 1979

Mental Disability and Lawyer Discipline, 12 J. Marshall J. Prac. &
Proc. 227 (1979)
Daniel L. Skoler
Roger M. Klein

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Daniel L. Skoler, Mental Disability and Lawyer Discipline, 12 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 227 (1979)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss2/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

MENTAL DISABILITY AND LAWYER
DISCIPLINE
DANIEL L. SKOLER*

& ROGER M.

KLEIN**

INTRODUCTION

Mental disability is not just an affliction of the poor and disadvantaged; it strikes the affluent, the educated, and those with
extensive professional and public responsibility as well. Its consequences among this last group can be quite devastating. Professionals are expected to police themselves and are accorded
power to individually review their own qualifications for continued service. When mental illness descends, a great deal of client harm and professional misfeasance may accumulate before
the pattern of emotional disturbance becomes fully apparent.
Difficult and delicate manuevers may be required to correct past
errors and to move, if necessary, toward suspension or removal
of the incapacitated person from professional practice.
This article is concerned with the practicing attorney who
encounters severe mental or emotional disability to the detriment of his clients and his capacity for continued and competent
functioning as a lawyer. Although reliable statistics are unavailable, it is not unreasonable to suppose that legally trained persons encounter the same social stresses and life trauma and
much the same incidence of emotional and psychic breakdown
(what psychiatrists term "patient care episodes") as the population at large. Today's best estimates suggest that one in ten
Americans suffers from some form of mental illness (defined as
schizophrenic, depressive, neurologic, and emotional and neurotic disorders requiring mental health treatment) and the President's Commission on Mental Health has pointed to evidence
suggesting an even higher incidence.' Almost ten million more
problems, and many
citizens have significant alcohol-related
2
others suffer from drug dependence.
* J.D., 1952, Harvard Law School. Mr. Skoler is presently Director,
American Bar Association Division of Public Service Activities.
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1. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 8-9
(vol. I, 1978); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, RESEARCH TASK
FORCE, RESEARCH IN THE SERVICE OF MENTAL HEALTH 2 (1975).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, REPORT OF THE TASK
PANEL ON THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PROBLEM 33-36 (vol. II, 1978); GLASSCOTE, PLAUT, HAMMERLY, O'NEILL, SHAFETZ & CUMMING, THE TREATMENT OF
ALCOHOLISM: A STUDY OF PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS, JOINT INFORMATION
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Professionals are not immune from such problems. At least
100 physicians commit suicide every year, and their alcoholism
rate is estimated at ten percent, compared to seven percent for
the general population.3 It is highly likely that these diseases
afflict lawyers in equally significant proportions as well. Indeed,
as the director of the nation's largest state bar disciplinary
agency has speculated, lawyers in certain forms of practice (trial
work, family law, and poverty law) may be especially vulnerable
4
to "patient care episodes" and disabling mental stress.
Occasional "horror stories" draw national attention, such as
the eighty-two year-old California Supreme Court Justice who,
until ordered retired in 1977, read magazines on the bench, practiced calisthenics during court conferences and regularly voted
on cases he had neither read nor heard.5 But these more dramatic cases may be only the tip of the iceberg. No accurate estimates exist of less visible and, no doubt, more commonplace
instances: a paranoid lawyer begins uncontrollably to lie to clients or to bring vengeful and groundless suits; an attorney suffers a nervous breakdown and simply cannot bring himself to
confront the daily tasks necessary to avoid harm to clients; or an
attorney suffering from a disease of the nervous system begins
to forget appointments and trial dates, leaving clients floundering in the midst of important case junctures.
Disciplinary proceedings generally commence after a lawyer has acted improperly and a client has already been harmed.
Despite the growing acceptance and incorporation in court rules
of provisions for suspension of mentally ill, alcoholic and hospitalized attorneys, preventive suspension or disciplinary actions
against such attorneys-those brought for mental disability per
se and before the manifestation of client harm-are almost nonexistent in many of the states.
Another difficult problem in the disciplining of mentally ill
attorneys arises when an attorney, in a proceeding for profesSERVICE OF AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N AND NATIONAL ASS'N FOR MENTAL

HEALTH (1967).
3. Clark & Matt, Physician,Heal Thyself, NEWSWEEK, August 8, 1977, at
74; Hirsh, The Medical-Legal Implications of the Problems of Errantor Sick
Physicians,CASE AND COMMENT, July-August 1977, at 23; see New Helpfor
Alcoholic Lawyers, ABA BAR LEADER, July 1976, at 23-26 (10% drinking rate

for lawyers, and alcoholism is a factor in more than one-half of all discipline
cases in California).
4. Letter from R. W. Stovitz, Senior Attorney, California State Bar,
Courts Division to authors (September 25, 1978). The multiple stresses
arise from such factors as "a great deal of matters clamoring for attention,
high expectations of clients which cannot often be fulfilled in our legal system and rapidly changing priorities in an attorney's caseload."
5. McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance, 19 Cal. 3d Spec.
Trib. Supp. 1, 564 P.2d 1, 138 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1977).
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sional misconduct, pleads mental incompetence as a defense, as
either a present disability or a condition at the time of the offense. Most states have accepted a prohibition of disciplinary
actions against attorneys who are presently incompetent to defend themselves. The attorney is generally suspended pending
rehabilitation or recovery, at which time the disciplinary proceedings must resume. But subtler legal questions arise when
an attorney who is presently competent defends on the grounds
that mental illness prevented conscious control of the behavior
at the time of the misconduct. Critics of this defense, like critics
of the insanity defense in criminal law, argue that courts lack an
adequate definition of incompetence and accurate psychiatric
testimony to identify it. Proponents caution against holding "irresponsible" persons, professional or otherwise, responsible for
their own acts. Perhaps because of the controversy, state courts
show no uniformity in their treatment of the defense.
Subsequent discussion will probe issues of this kind,
describing and analyzing the authoritative sources that have established the role of mental incompetence in disciplinary proceedings. Since approaches to the topic have varied widely
among jurisdictions, pertinent cases from a representative sampling of states (spanning several decades) will be examined. An
attempt will be made to sort and identify among the relevant
statutes, court rules, bar association ethical codes and judicial
decisions the major lines of response and legal postures that
have emerged, to compare and evaluate these competing responses, and to predict a trend. Although a greater number of
disciplinary complaints derive from or are related to alcoholism
and other drug dependency, these situations will only be dealt
with collaterally. 6 The prime focus will be on the problems of
mental illness and disabling neurosis and how these are handled in lawyer disciplinary systems.
Discussion and analysis will not cover the institutional
mechanisms that have arisen in the United States to deal with
discipline, misconduct and mental or physical disability of
judges-the so-called judicial conduct commissions. Patterned
largely after the California model established in 1960, this concept calls for the creation of state judicial performance bodies to
investigate complaints against judges, conduct formal hearings
and impose or recommend appropriate disciplinary or remedial
action by the various state supreme courts (typically, in the case
of mentally impaired judges, involuntary suspension or retire6. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 692 (1968) (misconduct involving intoxica-

tion as grounds for disciplinary action against an attorney).
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ment). 7 Today, in one of the fastest reform evolutions in the
court improvement field, over ninety percent of the states have
such commissions authorized and operating, and a similar body
is being considered for the federal judiciary.8 In some cases, the
authority is constitutional; in others, it derives from statute or
court rule. In most, the supervising commissions include nonjudicial attorneys and even non-lawyers. In some states (perhaps a quarter), there is a two-tier system with an investigative
commission and a dispositional commission that actually metes
out sanctions. Whatever the case, these judicial conduct commissions have replaced the cumbersome and rarely used techniques of impeachment, recall or resolution and now constitute
the major vehicle for acting upon complaints of mental or physical disability of sitting judges. The movement is attracting its
own body of literature and analysis, and although special substudies of mental disability actions have not as yet appeared,
only two years ago a national clearinghouse was established to
meet the growing communication and information interchange
needs of these systems.
MENTAL ILLNESS AS GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OR INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT

The ABA Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
Federal statutory or judicial standards concerning mental
unfitness as a ground for suspension or temporary removal from
practice are virtually nonexistent. Until 1970, no national standards-mandatory or advisory-dealt even peripherally with the
question. In that year, the American Bar Association adopted
the Code of Professional Responsibility to replace its sixty-yearold Canons of Professional Ethics, which made no statement on
or reference to the competency issue. Yet, even the Code
speaks only generally to the subject, suggesting "diligence" in
keeping disabled lawyers from practicing. 9
7. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION No. 1.22 (1973)
(discipline and removal of judges); Greenberg, The Task of Judging the
Judges, 59 JUDICATURE 458 (1976); Overton, GroundsforJudicial Discipline
in the Context of Judicial DisciplinaryCommissions, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
59 (1977) (part of a symposium on judicial discipline); The Centerfor Judicial Conduct Organizations,61 JUDICATURE 205 (1977).
8. H.R. 622, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) ("Judicial Tenure Act," to create a federal judicial conduct commission, presently pending before the
Congress). See generally, 62 JUDICATURE 147 (1978) (for earlier history of
this legislation).
9. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSirnTr, Ethical Consideration
1-6 (1976):

An applicant for admission to the bar or a lawyer may be unqualified, temporarily or permanently, for other than moral and educational
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The Code distinguishes two levels of obligations. "Ethical
Considerations" are aspirational in character. They command
less force than "Disciplinary Rules" which are mandatory. Although the Ethical Considerations "constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many
specific situations," Disciplinary Rules "state the minimum level
of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject
to disciplinary action." 10
The Ethical Considerations avoid any statement about the
method and extent of suspension appropriate for a showing of
incompetence. Unfortunately, the only relevant Disciplinary
Rule offers an even narrower statement about incompetence.
Instead of advocating suspension for the mentally ill attorney,
the Rule merely calls for withdrawal from representation as
cases require."
The ABA Code enjoys no legal status per se. However, approximately forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
have incorporated it in their laws (some with minor modifications) by legislation and court rules.' 2 In addition, numerous
courts have considered its exhortations in adjudicating questions of ethical conduct. For example, in St. Pierre'sCase'3 and
In re Fahey,'4 recent cases centering on the mental incompetence defense, judges in New Hampshire and California cited
the relevant Code provisions in their opinions. Although in
cases of this type courts tend, quite properly, to treat the Code
reasons, such as mental or emotional instability. Lawyers should be

diligent in taking steps to see that during a period of disqualification

such a person is not granted a license or, if licensed, is not permitted to
practice [footnote]. In like manner, when the disqualification has ter-

minated, members of the bar should assist such person in being licensed, or, if licensed, in being restored to his full right to practice.
10. Preamble and PreliminaryStatement, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 1 (1976).
11. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmirry, Disciplinary

Rule 2-

110(b) (1976):

A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission
if required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment,
if:
(3)' His mental or physical condition renders it unreasonably difficult
for him to carry out the employment effectively.
12. Interview with C. Russel Twist, ABA Center for Professional Discipline (August 1978). Only Colorado, Illinois and Maine have not expressly
adopted the Code. However, since some states have modified parts of the
Code and their methods of adoption vary, the 47-state estimate must be

viewed with some caution, as it required some judgment as to what constituted "adoption."
13. 113 N.H. 198, 304 A.2d 88 (1973).
14. 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973).
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as a guideline rather than a command, they frequently heed and
15
follow its dictates.
Court Rules and Statutes Governing Preventive Disciplinary
Actions
At least thirty-two states have promulgated rules setting
forth criteria for the suspension of mentally ill or alcoholic attorneys, 16 supplemented by statutes establishing the framework
for these actions.17 Many of these regulations derive from a recommendation of the landmark 1970 Clark Committee report on
the then "scandalous" state of the nation's disciplinary enforcement machinery. 18 Several regulations are adaptations of a
comparable formulation from Suggested Guidelines for Rules of
Disciplinary Enforcement, a model set of rules developed in 1974
by a joint group from the American Bar Association's Center for
Professional Discipline. The model rule mandates suspension
(or, in less stigmatic terminology, "inactive enrollment" or "disability inactive status") when an attorney has been judicially
declared incompetent, involuntarily committed, or is determined by a court to be incapacitated for law practice by virtue of
addiction to alcohol or other drugs or by diagnosis of mental illness after medical examination. 19 Assignment of a guardian or
15. Id. at 852-53, 505 P.2d at 1375, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 319. "Several courts
have invoked in support of this ground for discipline [moral turpitude] the
precepts of the former Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association ....
As of January 1, 1970, the Canons of Ethics were superseded by a
new Code of Professional Responsibility."
16. The authors' survey of published state codes and court rules revealed 32 states whose court rules provide for preventive suspension for
mental illness. Because some states fail to publish their court rules, a comprehensive study would probably reveal a substantially higher number. All
otherwise undocumented findings on this subject derive from this mid-1978
survey, and must be viewed with the caution appropriate to such a partial
examination.
17. See Agata, Admissions and Discipline of Attorneys in Federal District Courts: A Study and Proposed Rules, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court and most federal appellate and district
courts have traditionally disciplined attorneys based upon whether the
state courts in which the attorneys were licensed have disciplined them.
This multiplies the impact of the various state court rules.

18. ABA SPECIAL

COMMrrrEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-

MENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DIscIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,

Problem 20, at 110-15 (1970).

19. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE AND
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR RULES
OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Rule 22(A) (B), at 23-24 (3d ed. 1977) (hereinafter cited as SUGGESTED GUIDELINES). For cases applying this rule, see,
e.g., Florida Bar v. Minkus, 285 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1973) (suspension based on
adjudged incompetence to stand trial in another action); In re Edwards, 227
So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1969) (suspension based upon adjudged incompetency in a
separate matter, even though the judgment was under appeal); Anonymous
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conservator for an attorney is an additional ground for automatic suspension from practice in several states. 20 Suspension
is defined, in states adhering to these rules (or statutes based on
them), as a temporary transfer to inactive status carrying a prohibition on practice and limitations on bar association activi21
ties.
Other tenets of the model rule have had varying degrees of
state acceptance. Medical examinations to determine competency are authorized in many states, should the supreme court
find one necessary. 2 2 To facilitate the identification of mentally
ill attorneys, court clerks in several states must notify the
supreme court of any licensed attorney's judicial declaration of
incompetence or order of commitment to a mental hospital. 23 To
safeguard the rights of lawyers incapable of defending themselves, several states require that counsel for the attorney be appointed and present at disciplinary hearings in which
24
incompetence is an issue.
Most states have within their court rules some provision for
protection of a client's legal interests after his or her attorney
has been suspended. Typically, the rules require a suspended
attorney (or one disciplined in another way) to send a copy of
the court order requiring discipline (or other notice of such action) to all clients with matters pending. 25 Presumably, this requirement would present compliance difficulties to a committed
or incompetent attorney. Some states recognize these difficulties and expressly address the problem posed when a mentally
ill attorney loses the use of his or her license and is forced to
abandon clients. Many have adopted the 1974 Suggested Guidelines rule on the subject:
If an attorney has been transferred to disability inactive status
v. New York State Bar Ass'n, 47 App. Div. 2d 83, 366 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975)

(suspension based upon an involuntary institutional commitment).
20. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(a) (West Supp. 1978);
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, Ch. 4, art. 15, § 9(a) (West 1974).
21. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6006 (West Supp. 1978).

LA.

22. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, Ch. 4, art. 15, § 9(a) (West 1974); N.J.
COURT RULES §§ 1:20-4(g), 1:20-11(b) (West); SuP. CT. RULES FOR THE GovERNMENT OF THE BAR OF OHIo, rule V, 10(c); RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE
W. VA. STATE BAR, art. VI, § 26a(b). See also In re M, 59 N.J. 304, 282 A.2d 37
(1971).
23. E.g., ARiz. SuP. CT.

RULES, rule 42(b); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
IOWA RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE

§ 6007(a) (West Supp. 1978);

BAR, rule 118.16; NEV. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 119.
24. E.g., ARIZ. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 42(c); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-353
(Supp. 1978); Mo. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 5.21(b); WASH. DISCIPLINARY RULES,
rule XIV(c); RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE W. VA. STATE BAR, art.
§ 26a(b); DISCIPLINARY CODE OF THE WYO. STATE BAR, rule XI(b).
25. E.g., INTEGRATION RULE OF THE FLA. STATE BAR, rule 11.10(6).

VI,
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because of incapacity or disability. . . and no partner, executor or
other responsible party capable of conducting the attorney's affairs
is known to exist, the presiding judge in the judicial district of the
[appropriate court of general jurisdiction] in which the attorney
maintained his practice upon proper proof of the fact, shall appoint
an attorney or attorneys to inventory the files of the inactive...
attorney and to take action as seems26indicated to protect the interests of the attorney and his clients.
States that set forth mental disability criteria for suspension
often define converse procedures and conditions for reinstatement. The 1974 Suggested Guidelines requires an affirmative
showing that the disability has been removed or that the attorney fully qualifies to practice law.2 7 Some states additionally
permit automatic reinstatement of a judicially suspended attorney once those proceedings are judicially terminated. 28 Except
when reinstatement is automatic, most states limit the frequency with which suspended attorneys can petition for return
to active status. An one-year waiting period between applications is common, although the court may often establish a
29
shorter period at its discretion.
Laws of this type have survived constitutional challenges
claiming that they were overly vague. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina held in In re Chipley3 ° that use of "in the judgment of ordinary men" as the standard for determining mental
incompetence in a South Carolina statute sufficiently warned attorneys of the degree of mental responsibility demanded of
them. The court indicated that this test is used in other statutes
31
where the mental incompetency issue arises.
26. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at Rule 23(a); accord, CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6180-6180.14, 6190-6190.6 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. Sup.
CT. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE § 18-4-17; PA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, rule 302; R.I. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 42-18(a); S.D. SuP. CT. DISCIPLINARY RULES § 9; RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE W. VA. STATE BAR, art.
VI, § 26(b). See also Anonymous v. N. Y. State Bar Ass'n, 47 App. Div. 2d 83,

366 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1975).
27. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at Rule 22(F).
28.

See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(a) (West Supp. 1978); IOWA

118.16; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
l10A, § 759 (1977); S.D. SuP. CT. DISCIPLINARY RULES § 6(d); TENN. SuP. CT.

RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR, rule

RULES, rule 42-21.7.
29. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at Rule 22(F). See also IOWA
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR, rule

118.16;

KAN. SUP. CT. RULES,

rule 221(d); N.M. SuP. CT. RULES GOVERNING DISCIPLINE, rule 18-4-13; PA.
RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, rule 302; S.D. Sup. CT. DISCIPLINARY
RULES § 6(d); TENN. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 42-21.6.

30. 254 S.C. 588, 176 S.E.2d 412 (1970), cert. den. sub nom., Chipley v.
Roberts, 400 U.S. 905 (1970), cert. den. sub nom., In re Disbarment of
Chipley, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), reh. den., 402 U.S. 1005 (1971).

31. In re Chipley, 254 S.C. 588, 589, 176 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1970).
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Preventive DisciplinaryActions in Court
Notwithstanding the prevalence of rules permitting suspension for mental incompetence, surprisingly few court cases have
dealt with preventive suspensions in the past ten to twenty
years. This may be explained, in part, by the fact that state bar
boards conduct most grievance proceedings; these actions reach
court and are published in reporters only when an attorney appeals. 32 Also, state bar disciplinary boards may permit attorneys threatened with medical suspensions to withdraw from
practice without the filing of charges. Texas, for example, offers
such an alternative to attorneys who face an incompetency action. The medical suspension may occur only if the afflicted at'33
torney "is attempting to conduct the practice of law.
Newly-adopted court rules and changes in the Code seem to
have spawned a recent surge in preventive disciplinary actions.A4 Few court rules on incompetence suspension existed a
decade ago, 35 and such suspensions were virtually impossible
before the adoption of this kind of rule. In these cases, unlike
other disciplinary proceedings, client complaints and ethics
committee findings of careless or dishonest professional conduct or extra-practice offenses evincing "moral turpitude" are
unnecessary. At most, such misconduct is treated as an indication of mental incompetence and not as grounds for discipline
itself. Instead, the documentation of behavior sufficiently aberrant to convince the court of mental illness is sufficient to transfer the attorney to inactive status.
32. MICH. SuP. CT. RULES § 8, Rule 15 (suspension of attorneys in certain
instances of mental illness or alcoholism resulting in "complete social disintegration"). This rule was applied in the suspension of three attorneys in
1974, one attorney in 1975 and three attorneys in 1976, but none of these

cases reached the courts. Interview with Richard H. Senter, Michigan State
Bar Grievance Board (August 1978).
33. TEX. CODE ANN. tit. 14, App., art. 12, § 34(a) (Vernon 1973).
34. Research in 1974 uncovered no disciplinary actions based solely
upon alleged mental illness. Place & Bloom, Mental Fitness Requirements
for the Practiceof Law, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 579, 590 (1974). There has been
a rise in the volume of suspension adjudications not involving charges of
misconduct since 1974. See, e.g., Matter of Howey, 267 S.C. 430, 229 S.E.2d
264 (1976); Matter of Wicklund, 75 Wis. 2d 1, 248 N.W.2d 490 (1977).
35. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 1, art. 11, §§ 1-11 (Supp.
1978) (conformed to rule of SUGGESTED GUIDELINES in 1971); WASH. DisciPLINARY RULES FOR ATTORNEYS, rules IX, XIV (comprehensive incompetence suspension regulation); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.286 (repealed 1978)
(previously paralleled the SUGGESTED GUIDELINES rule, permitting an attorney to elect voluntary suspension when faced with a medical suspension).
For an early application of the Washington rule, see In re Campbell, 74
Wash. 2d 276, 444 P.2d 784 (1968) (inactive enrollment based not upon bizarre beliefs, but upon irrational concepts of use of court process to compel
indefinite employment).
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In State v. Cadden,36 attorney Cadden began to conduct his
everyday life in a bizarre and inappropriate manner. He tried,
for example, to exchange sheets he had purchased at a store for
a more expensive item without paying the additional cost and
then billed the sales clerk for professional services rendered.
He interjected himself into courtroom proceedings believing he
was the defendant's attorney, although defendant's counsel was
present. At his disciplinary hearing two court-appointed psychiatrists testified that Cadden was schizophrenic. The court found
that Cadden was sufficiently mentally ill as to be unfit to practice law under Wisconsin's version of the Code. Noting that
Cadden was receiving treatment for his illness, the court suspended him for six months and until it found him mentally able
to resume practice.
In In re Chipley,3 7 the attorney was diagnosed by psychiatrists as suffering from schizophrenia. As a result of his effort to
obtain release from a mental hospital, a jury found Chipley mentally ill and in need of custodial care and treatment. The court
conceded that Chipley had done no wrong, but felt the evidence
uncontrovertably indicated that he
was so mentally unstable as
38
to be incapable of practicing law.
In FloridaBar v. Worthington,39 a county court had found

attorney Worthington incompetent. He was diagnosed as suffering from Korsakoff's syndrome, with cortical deterioration, and
his symptoms were severe. He was confused, tremulous, unable
to manage his affairs, and had been hospitalized twice for the
illness in the year before the proceedings. The court, declaring
incompetency, suspended Worthington "subject to any rights he
may have to apply for reinstatement at the proper time and
upon proper showing." 4
In states with regulations addressing the problem of mentally ill attorneys, substantial uniformity of approach appears to
have been achieved. Some states, however, appear more vigilant than others in searching out potentially harmful lawyers.
Even among states adhering to the 1974 Suggested Guidelines,
wide variations in the volume of cases exist.4 1 At the same time,
36. 56 Wis. 2d 320, 201 N.W.2d 773 (1972).
37. 254 S.C. 588, 176 S.E.2d 412 (1970).
38. Id. at 592, 176 S.E.2d at 415.
39. 276 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1973).
40. Id. at 40. See also In re Davis, 264 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1978) (indefinite suspension subject to petition for reinstatement when the attorney

could sustain burden of demonstrating that he had overcome his psychiatric problems).
41. Kentucky and Missouri provide for suspension because of mental
illness, but no cases have been brought under these provisions. On the
other hand, Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 256.286 (West) (repealed 1978), establishing
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no cases have been found where an attorney was disbarred or
42
permanently suspended for mental incompetence per se. Suspension or inactive status pending court reinstatement stands
as the primary, if not the sole, protective measure applied. The
homogeneity as to degree of discipline imposed in these cases
suggests, therefore, a uniformity of outlook as to the nature of
the problem and purpose of discipline.
In 1978, this general approach was confirmed in new Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings, released by the American Bar Association and formally endorsed
by the ABA's House of Delegates in early 1979. 43 These standards largely embrace the 1970 Clark Report and the 1974 Suggested Guidelines but, as standards, are more compact in
format. They embrace the preferable "disability inactive status"
rather than the "suspension" rubric (which can readily be confused with disciplinary suspension), and one point not directly
handled by earlier formulations: the status of the disability defense not as to present capacity to stand trial but to a claim of
past or temporary incapacity which is no longer present. The
new standards suggest that past disability at the time of misconduct "merely constitutes a claim in mitigation" and is no bar to
charges of misconduct or capacity to defend against them."
MENTAL INCOMPETENCE AS A DEFENSE
TO DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS

There is a consensus, backed by court rule and statute,
which permits preventive suspension of attorneys who appear
likely, because of mental instability, to default on obligations or
harm client interests in the future. Yet, on the issue of mental
incompetence as a defense to disbarment proceedings, the authorities are not in accord. Three distinct strands of legal thinking have developed and coexist to the present.
One strand of thinking, comprised primarily of early cases,
the mental illness suspension, had been applied in numerous disciplinary

cases.
42. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1259, 1261 (1973) (validity and ap-

plication of regulations requiring suspension for mental illness).
43. ABA STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DIsCIPLINARY AND DisABrrY PROCEEDINGS, Standard 12 ('Transfer to Disability Inactive Status") (hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS).
44. Id. at Commentary to Standard 12.6. The Standards also clarify the
confidentiality of disability proceedings (Standard 12.3), the public charac-

ter of court orders transferring lawyers to or from "disability inactive" status (Standard 12.4) and offer much more guidance than the earlier

guidelines on the imposition and termination of probation (Standards 6.7
and 6.8). It should be noted, however, that mental disability is still considered grounds for invoking "lawyer discipline" (Standard 5.1).
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tends to reject insanity and other types of mental disability as
defenses to a disciplinary proceeding. An opposing school views
mental incompetence as a complete defense to disbarment proceedings and permits an attorney to successfully argue that his
or her rehabilitation has made disciplinary action unnecessary.
The third line of argument takes a middle position: it makes no
statement about mental illness as a defense to disciplinary action, but advocates leniency in discipline if the attorney's defalcations derive from severe mental strain or disability.
Cases in which an attorney raises the insanity defense in a
disciplinary proceeding are rare. Rarer still are cases where a
disciplinary decision hinges solely, or even largely, on proof of
genuine mental illness. Rather, dispositions are frequently determined on narrow factual grounds peculiar to each case.
Often, the court seems to focus on other issues: the gravity of
the attorney's misconduct; financial difficulties and other extenuating circumstances; the attorney's prior disciplinary record;
and whether the attorney made restitution to injured clients for
losses caused or fees improperly earned.4 5 This tendency
makes application of prior decisions to present cases a difficult
undertaking. Such factors, together with the variety of philosophic approaches to the defense, have created a confusing,
often contradictory, body of case law with little light emanating
from disciplinary board and committee decisions and practices
46
prior to court involvement.
45.

See, e.g., Doyle v. State Bar, 15 Cal. 3d 973, 975, 544 P.2d 937, 939, 126

Cal. Rptr. 801, 803 (1976). "Determination of the discipline to be imposed
must be based on a 'balanced consideration of [all] the relevant factors,'
...including any mitigating circumstances." In re Gelzer, 31 N.J. 542, 544,
158 A.2d 331, 332 (1960) (" [R] estoration and proper distribution of the funds
after complaint has been made to an Ethics Committee . . ." can be a

proper mitigating circumstance.)
46. The disciplinary process, of course, does not begin with the state
supreme court decision on a lawyer misconduct complaint. There is an initial investigative inquiry handled by a bar disciplinary committee, a professional investigator or a disciplinary agency staff lawyer. Findings here are
typically reported to an "inquiry panel" of the state disciplinary agency or
bar association which determines whether formal action should be taken or
charges dismissed or an informal admonition imposed. If charges are filed,
formal pleadings ensue and the matter is set for trial before either a panel
of the state disciplinary agency, a court referee or commissioner or, in a few
states, before a jury. After trial, a recommendation is filed with the state
supreme court (or with the state disciplinary board or commission which, in
turn, makes a recommendation to the supreme court) suggesting dismissal
of the complaint, private reprimand, public reprimand, suspension for a
definite or indefinite period (sometimes with conditions of probation imposed) or disbarment (either absolutely or for a substantial period of years
with reinstatement quite difficult). The state supreme court receives the
recommendation, reviews the case transcript and any briefs, often hears
oral argument and enters a final judgment of discipline (including removal
from the roll of attorneys in cases of suspension or disbarment). United
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Court Rules and Statutes on the Incompetence Defense
Research reveals no state statute or court rule directly recognizing or precluding a defense to disciplinary proceedings on
grounds of mental disability. One provision of the Suggested
Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement, however, requires courts to hold in abeyance any disciplinary proceeding
during an attorney's suspension because of mental incompetence. Several states have adopted this provision with minor
variations. 47 Another Suggested Guidelines rule, employed as a
companion to the above rule, requires that if during a disciplinary proceeding an attorney contends he or she suffers from a
mental or physical disability or is addicted to alcohol or drugs to
the extent that an adequate defense cannot be made, the court
must immediately transfer the attorney to inactive status. After
a subsequent medical examination, the court must determine if
the attorney is mentally fit to practice law. If so, it resumes the
disciplinary proceedings; if not, the suspension continues. 4
Cases applying this rule are scarce. However, under it, an
attorney who is incompetent at the time of hearing or trial cannot be disbarred. He or she will be suspended without prejudice
to the merits of the misconduct charge and will remain so until
sufficient competence has been restored to stand trial in a disciplinary proceeding.
Two state rules on capacity to stand trial deserve special
note. Missouri's court rules permit resumption of disciplinary
proceedings after a mental incompetence plea if the court finds
49
that the misconduct would warrant disbarment in any event.
Here, the intervening stage of suspension is dropped, disciplinary proceedings resume and the attorney can be disbarred. In
contrast, the Suggested Guidelines rule requires that the attorney be competent before the court may decide whether the offense, by its nature, warrants disbarment and whether the
attorney in. fact committed the offense.
States Supreme Court review may be sought by the charged attorney as a
final step, but this rarely occurs. Reported decisions on these cases are
readily available to lawyers, by and large, only with respect to state
supreme court review and decisions on disciplinary recommendations from
trial panels, hearing officers, or state boards and committees. See BRADNER,
ABA CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, BACKGROUND SHEET ON LAwYER DISCIPLINARY PROCESS (1977).

47. E.g., ARiz. SUP. CT. RULES, rule 42(d); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6007(c)

(West Supp. 1978)

(pending disciplinary proceedings are not

abated, even though the attorney chooses "inactive enrollment"); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, § 757 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7-124a, Rule 221(c) (Supp.
1977); NEV. SUP. CT. RULES, rule 117.
48. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at Rule 22(B),(C).
49. Mo. SuP. CT. RULES, rule 5.21(c).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules set up a different standard for the resolution of disciplinary proceedings where an attorney pleads incompetence. Although there appears to be an
absence of interpretive cases, the rule stands as the only regulation specifically addressing the incompetence defense (as distinguished from regulations governing when proceedings
involving the defense may take place). The Oklahoma rule provides:
Whenever a proceeding charging that a member is personally
incapable to practice law is based upon conduct of neglect of duty
in respect to the affairs of a client, the complaint must also allege
specifically any such conduct which would justify the imposition of
discipline, so that the Trial Authority may hear evidence upon, and
in his report shall make findings and recommendations as to
be disciplined orfound personally incapable to
whether he should
50
practice law.

The rules explain further that "personal incapability" to practice
law (which may result in suspension) includes judicial declaration of incompetence, involuntary commitment, successful use
of the mental incompetence defense in any trial, or any other
disabling mental or physical infirmity, including drug or alcohol
51
dependence.
Judicial Decisions on the Incompetence Defense: The Three
Schools
It has been suggested that the majority of court rules dealing with the incompetence defense skirt the issue. Rather than
speak to whether incompetence can exonerate an attorney who
has misbehaved, they discuss when and whether disciplinary
proceedings may be postponed. The ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility likewise evades the question by treating only
preventive suspensions for mental illness, not the mental illness
defense to disciplinary proceedings. Thus, judicial decisions
must be examined for legal underpinnings regarding the incompetence defense. As indicated, the cases sort themselves into
three categories, and a review of the distinctions between them
is instructive.
Mental Incompetence as No Defense
One line of cases, many of older vintage, takes the position
that an attorney's mental state at the time he or she acted in an
unprofessional manner is irrelevant to a disciplinary decision.
50. OKIA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 1, App. 1, art. XI, § 5 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
51. Id.
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Judges here state that unlike a criminal trial, a disciplinary action's primary goal is not to punish the attorney but to protect
his or her potential clients. Viewing discipline as an important
deterrent to future misconduct, there is an implicit concern that
the deterrent effect will be weakened by more indulgent standards.
In In re Patlak,52 the attorney received money against a
promise to perform certain client services which were not performed. Later, Patlak was convicted of larceny for activities subsequent to the professional misconduct, but the criminal
conviction was overturned when a jury found that he was insane
at the time of the crime. The court held that whether he knew
what he was doing was not of controlling influence in the disciplinary proceeding, and disbarred him. Insanity is a defense to
a disciplinary procriminal charges, the court explained, but
53
ceeding is designed to protect the public.
In Louisiana State Bar Association v. Theard,54 an attorney
committed forgery with intent to defraud the owner of a promissory note. At the time of the misdeed, the attorney suffered
from amnesia and the court found him irresponsible. Soon after, he was placed in an asylum for several years. The Louisiana
Supreme Court disbarred Theard, distinguishing a disciplinary
proceeding from a criminal case. The court considered irrelevant "whether the dishonest conduct stems from an incapacity
to discern between right and wrong or was engendered by a spe55
cific criminal intent."
Subsequent developments in the Theard case may limit its
importance. In a federal court disbarment proceeding based on
the Louisiana disbarment, an order was issued striking Theard
from the court rolls of the Eastern District of Louisiana. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,and in Theard
v. United States,56 made its only statement in recent years regarding the insanity defense to disbarment when it reversed and
remanded the district court order. The significance of this reversal appears limited, however, in view of the Court's focus on the
peculiar factual situation. The disbarment proceeding came
eighteen years after the misconduct, during which time Theard
52. 368 Ill.
547, 15 N.E.2d 309 (1938).
53. Id. at 553, 15 N.E.2d at 312. New York is another state which seems
to have adhered to the "no defense" school. See Dallal v. Darrigrand, 31
App. Div. 2d 442, 298 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1969); In re Samuels, 22 App. Div. 2d 564,
257 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1965); In re Anonymous, 21 App. Div. 2d 48, 248 N.Y.S.2d

368 (1964).
54. 222 La. 327, 62 So. 2d 501 (1952).

55. Id. at 335, 62 So. 2d at 503.
56. 354 U.S. 278 (1957).
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had received hospital treatment, had been released from the
hospital and had resumed his practice, all without a client complaint. The Supreme Court stated: "We do not think that 'the
principles of right and justice' require a federal court to enforce
disbarment of a man eighteen years after [the misdeed] when
concededly he 'was suffering under an exceedingly abnormal
mental condition, some degree of insanity.' ",57
It is significant that in the Theard decision, the United
States Supreme Court cited no statute or court rule as authority,
nor did it base its logic on previous federal decisions. It is unclear, therefore, whether the Court merely "tempered justice
with mercy" about a long forgotten crime, or instead accepted
the second school's view that an attorney who misbehaved only
because he was insane, but has since recovered, should not be
disciplined. 58
Another, and somewhat broader, articulation of the thesis
rejecting the incompetence defense can be found in In re
Quimby.59 In Quimby, the court stated: "An act against a client
evidencing moral turpitude, even though attributable to some
aberration or stress that would warrant the prosecutor in abstaining from criminal prosecution, may nevertheless warrant
60
severe disciplinary action concerning an officer of the court.
Mental Incompetence as a Complete Defense
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the "no defense"
approach lies a more recent, more tolerant approach which admits incompetence as a defense to disbarment proceedings.
Proponents concede that disciplinary action may be designed to
protect the public, but argue that its inevitable effect is also to
punish the attorney involved. If this is so, they ask, is it fair to
punish attorneys for acts which they could not control? Courts
of this persuasion answer in the negative.
Once a court accepts this argument, the critical issue in disciplinary proceedings against an attorney of questionable
mental competence becomes: does he or she qualify as truly incompetent? In other words, the decision hinges on whether the
attorney had mental responsibility for his or her acts at the time
of the misdeed. Several state courts have incorporated into
their rules a definition of incompetence or mental illness for use
in mental infirmity suspensions. Although the definitions vary
widely, almost all emphasize the ability to act effectively upon
57. Id. at 282.
58. Cf. In re Sherman, 58 Wash. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 888 (1960).
59. 359 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
60. Id. at 258.
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the external environment. The Ohio Supreme Court's definition
is fairly typical, labeling mental illness as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that
grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize real61
ity, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life."
Courts which admit the insanity defense have distinguished
two types of mental disorders, only one of which qualifies an attorney for the defense. Psychosis and acute neurosis are instances of the disorders qualifying an attorney for the defense.
These diseases often require hospitalization and, as the courts
have defined them, involve major mental debilitation of an organic or inorganic cause. While afflicted by such illnesses, attorneys cannot be considered responsible for their behavior. They
do not know the nature and quality of their acts and cannot distinguish right from wrong. These courts, however, often distinguish psychosis and neurosis from personality disorders and
emotional strains resulting from the more trying circumstances
of everyday life. Such deviations in behavior include drug addiction and extreme variations in personality, such as belligerence or compulsivity, to which many persons are periodically
subject. Courts frequently choose the personality disorder
designation when psychiatric testimony is contradictory, or
when neither side introduces sufficient testimony and the evidence, though establishing a62behavioral aberration, is insufficient to prove mental illness.
This distinction is illustrated by two Wisconsin Supreme
Court cases. In State v. Cadden,63 the attorney displayed bizarre and inappropriate behavior, and two psychiatrists testified
that he suffered from schizophrenia. The court deemed this consuspension under
dition sufficiently severe to warrant a medical
64
Wisconsin's incompetency suspension rule.
In a subsequent case, State v. Heilprin,65 the defendant attorney was subjected to the same disciplinary measure as in
Cadden-suspension pending court certification of mental
fitness. However, the court did not impose a medical suspension; the suspension was based on misconduct which the court
refused to excuse because of mental condition. To permit the
61. OHIO

REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(A) (Page Supp. 1978); cf.WiS. STAT.

§ 51.01(12)(b)

(West Supp. 1978) (excludes alcoholism from definition).
62. Place & Bloom, Mental Fitness Requirementsfor the Practiceof Law,
23 BUFFALO L. REV. 579, 585 (1974). See also Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 739, 742
ANN.

(1964).
63. 56 Wis. 2d 320, 201 N.W.2d 773 (1972).
64. Id. at 330-31, 201 N.W.2d at 778.
65. 59 Wis. 2d 312, 207 N.W.2d 878 (1973).
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attorney to continue practice, the court said, would be dangerous. Heilprin's aberrant behavior consisted of abusing and
threatening court staff, exposing himself and making sexual advances to clients, threatening suits known to lack merit and repeatedly suggesting violence toward his opponents. The
attorney had a history of sexual problems in his marriage, and a
psychiatrist testified that he suffered from an obsessive-compulsive personality disorder. The court distinguished this disorder
from Cadden's schizophrenic condition (which was viewed as a
true mental illness), declaring "a personality, disorder is not an
illness,. . . but a disorder of behavior. '66 The court further explained that Heilprin's actions were not completely out of control; he could understand the difference between right and
wrong and appreciate the impropriety of his conduct. Pointing
out that many people exhibit the characteristics associated with
Heilprin's disorder, the court expressed concern that recognizing so common a problem as a defense to disciplinary proceedings would invite abuse of disciplinary concepts.
A more recent Wisconsin case, State v. Ledvina,67 further
clarifies the mental illness-personality disorder distinction.
Here, the attorney sent vicious letters to and otherwise harrassed a resident of his town. At one point, Ledvina even encouraged the driver of a car in which he was a passenger to run
over a passing pedestrian he disliked. A psychiatrist diagnosed
Ledvina's problem as a "personality disorder ... to be distinguished from a psychosis or other serious mental illness where
an individual attorney is unable to perceive reality and where he
exists in a world of fantasy and delusion." 68 The court declared
that such a personality disorder was neither a defense to professional misconduct nor cause for a finding of incapacity to practice law warranting medical suspension under Wisconsin's
69
disciplinary enforcement code.
The boundary defined by the three Wisconsin cases is one
to which courts in several states have adhered. Those accepting
the insanity defense, when confronted with an attorney suffering from a psychosis or other serious mental illness, merely suspend the attorney. Indeed, if a lawyer guilty of professional
misconduct can demonstrate that he committed the acts while
mentally irresponsible, but has since been rehabilitated, the
court will not discipline him at all.
66. Id. at 319, 207 N.W.2d at 883.

67. 71 Wis. 2d 195, 237 N.W.2d 683 (1976).
68. Id. at 204, 237 N.W.2d at 688.
69. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 236.286 (West) (repealed 1978). This statute was
replaced by Wis. RULES GOvERNING DISCIPLINE OF ATrORNEYS, rules 5, 9, &
10, which are substantially the same.
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An early case articulating this school of thought is In re
Sherman.70 Attorney Sherman, recently licensed to practice in
Washington, falsely stated on his application for admission to
the Washington bar that he had never taken the bar examination in another state. In fact, he had failed the test twice in California, then failed once and passed it a second time in Oregon.
Because of his history of hostility and a past psychiatric report
diagnosing schizophrenia, the court decided that his behavior
might have resulted from mental illness involving a persecution
complex and, therefore, did not constitute willful perjury. The
court declined to disbar Sherman, but rather remanded the case
to the state referee with instructions to disbar unless Sherman
could demonstrate both mental irresponsibility at the time of
his perjury and his current capacity to practice law. In a frequently cited passage the court explained:
The logic of the situation would seem to dictate the conclusion
that, if he [Sherman] was mentally responsible for the conduct we
have outlined, he should be disbarred; and if he was not mentally
responsible, he should not be permitted to practice law.
However, the flaw in this logic is that he may have been mentally irresponsible for the falsification of his application for admission to practice law in this state in December, 1956 ... and, yet,
have sufficiently improved in the [years] intervening to capably
and competently represent his clients. Supporting the latter possibility is Mr. Sherman's claimed successful practice, since September, 1958, in Pacific County. We are advised of no
71 complaint of any
character made against him during that period.
California, with its extensively funded and well-staffed disciplinary apparatus has produced, perhaps, more cases involving mental disability issues in disciplinary proceedings than any
other state. In one case, Hyland v. State Bar of California,72 the
incompetence defense was defined in a more limited way. Hyland willfully commingled trust funds he controlled with his
own funds and misappropriated other client monies. As a defense, he pleaded that marital difficulties during the period in
question rendered him mentally incompetent but that by trial
time he had recovered completely. The court disbarred Hyland.
However, in taking such action the court seemed to recognize
the availability of the incompetence defense:
Even though mental incompetence is a defense in State Bar
disciplinary proceedings, we conclude that the showing made by
petitioner does not justify reopening hearings before the Board of
70. 58 Wash. 2d 1, 354 P.2d 888 (1960); accord, In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842,
505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973); State v. Ledvina, 71 Wis. 2d 195, 237
N.W.2d 683 (1976); State v. Heilprin, 59 Wis. 2d 312, 207 N.W.2d 878 (1973).
71. 58 Wash. 2d at 6-7, 354 P.2d at 890 (partially quoted in ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY 4 (1976)).
72. 59 Cal. 2d 765, 382 P.2d 369, 31 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1963).
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Governors. Petitioner is not excused from presenting his defenses
at the local committee hearings simply because he did not know
mental incompetence was a defense. Mental incompetence has
been considered in previous State Bar disciplinary proceedings
73
and petitioner is charged with knowledge of those cases.
The court went on to observe that when an attorney's mental
incompetence rendered him unable to form the intent required
for establishing an offense, he should not be disciplined or disbarred; rather, he should be prohibited from practicing law during the period of his disability and should be enrolled as an
inactive member of the bar.
Subsequent case law in California seems not to have embraced the Hyland dictum to any appreciable extent; in fact, it
has shown Hyland to be something of an aberration. In one 1973
case, expert psychiatric testimony concerning "psycho-neurotic
difficulties" appears to have supported the California Supreme
Court's dismissal of misconduct charges which were not viewed
as involving moral turpitude or impairment of capacity for honest professional performance. 74 However, these cases seem to
be isolated, and in the face of serious offenses clearly involving
moral turpitude, the California Supreme Court has not hesitated
to impose disbarment or other discipline even though the offending conduct may have been caused or contributed to by
75
mental illness or psychosis.
Mental Disability or Stress as a Mitigating Factor,but No
Defense
The third case law approach stresses the mitigating effect of
conduct arising from mental disorder and, most frequently, is
applied to emotional and psychological problems falling short of
mental illness. Although it is conceptually, and by implication, a
variant of the "no defense" school, the cases often make no
statement either way about the insanity defense, but rather focus on the extent to which discipline should be applied. Conceding that mental strain or extremity in no way excuses
misconduct, judges seem willing to count aberrant episodes and
psychological problems (usually short of mental illness) as mitigating factors in determining the appropriate extent and nature
73. Id. at 774, 382 P.2d at 374, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
74. In re Fahey, 8 Cal. 3d 842, 505 P.2d 1369, 106 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1973) (failure to file returns and pay federal income taxes for 3 successive years); cf.
In re Craig, 12 Cal. 2d 93, 97, 82 P.2d 442, 444 (1938).
75. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 19 Cal. 3d 249, 561 P.2d 285, 137 Cal. Rptr. 195
(1977) (undisputed diagnostic evidence of manic depressive psychosis at
time of offense); Snyder v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 3d 286, 555 P.2d 1104, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 864 (1976) (manic depressive type of disorder held not to excuse forgery of court documents).
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of disciplinary measures. Especially when misconduct is a byproduct of stringent circumstances, such as financial or family
crises, the presence of mental problems in these cases can
lighten the disciplinary imposition.
A decision that articulates this viewpoint well is Hoffman v.
New York State Bar Association.76 On numerous occasions, the
defendant attorney delivered certified copies of nonexistent divorce decrees. He also neglected to commence arbitration proceedings on behalf of clients. But Hoffman suffered from
hypoglycemia, a pre-diabetic condition that on an episodic basis
causes mental impairment characterized by confusion, forgetfulness and defects in judgment. In the opinion of medical experts, it was the hypoglycemia which accounted for Hoffman's
conduct; no willful or deliberate intent to deceive his clients was
found to exist. The court did not find the condition a defense to
the disciplinary actions, but did treat the disorder as a "mitigating factor" in arriving at the extent of discipline to be imposed.
An earlier New Jersey case took a similar tack on charges of
commingling client trust funds with personal funds. In In re
Gelzer,77 the court rejected the attorney's attempted mental duress defense, stating that personal financial stress and its accompanying emotional disorganization provided no excuse for
professional violation. At the same time, the court found that
these factors might be considered in mitigation, and presumably
7 8
did so in imposing a one-year suspension.
Another jurisdiction in which the mitigation approach
seems to be making inroads is California. Essentially a state
which rejects the insanity defense, the supreme court articulated a hard public protection policy in Grove v. State Bar of
76. 41 App. Div. 2d 998, 343 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1973).
77. 31 N.J. 542, 158 A.2d 331 (1960).

78. See Florida Bar v. Price, 348 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1977) (severe personal
problems resulting in "emotional stress" accepted in mitigation and reprimand and one month suspension imposed for failure to file pleadings and
entry of false satisfaction of judgment); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Stevenson, 356 So. 2d 887 (La. 1978) ("depersonalization neurosis" accepted as
mitigating factor in imposing 3-year suspension of attorney convicted of
credit card fraud); St. Pierre's Case, 13 N.H. 149, 304 A.2d 88 (1973) (attorney, who was addicted to medication prescribed by a doctor for energy and
weight problems, and who was convicted for failure to file tax returns, could
not dispense with disciplinary action, but addiction was a factor considered
in assessing the severity of the sanction); In re Wasserman, 50 App. Div. 2d
299, 377 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1975) (correction of 11 of 13 neglected matters to client's satisfaction and "chronic moderately severe depression of neurotic
type" as a contributing factor in such neglect considered as mitigating factors in a two-year suspension); In re Gardner, 39 App. Div. 2d 84, 332
N.Y.S.2d 113 (1960) (severe mental and emotional strain occasioned by marital discord was recognized as a mitigating factor in suspension for negligent handling of an estate's stock shares).
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7 9 which has been extensively and continually cited
California,

in recent decisions imposing disbarment despite evidence of
mental illness, extreme neurosis or heavy emotional strain:
We realize that in many cases psychoneurotic problems may underlie professional misconduct and moral turpitude. In this area
our duty lies in the assurance that the public will be protected in
the performance of the high duties of the attorney rather than in an
analysis of the reasons for his delinquency. Our primary concern
must be the fulfillment of proper professional standards, whatever
the unfortunate 80cause, emotional or otherwise, for the attorney's
failure to do so.
Two recent cases suggest a growing, albeit still sporadic, acceptance of the mitigation approach despite Grove's severe
standard. In Doyle v. State Bar of California,8 1 the court stated:
Our guiding principle is that 'The purpose of a disciplinary proceeding is not punitive but to inquire into the fitness of the attorney
to continue in that capacity for the protection of the public, the
courts, and the legal profession.' [citation] Determination of the
discipline to be imposed must be based on a 'balanced consideration of [all] the relevant
factors' [citation], including any mitigat82
ing circumstances.
Doyle was a polio victim, and the court found that during the
period in which his conduct took place, he encountered substantial domestic, business and emotional problems. Because of
these mitigating factors (which went beyond emotional disability), the court imposed a suspension, stayed it, and placed Doyle
on probation.
The court took the same approach in Gassman v. State Bar
83
of California,
where an attorney who committed various improprieties in the course of practice had his suspension partially
stayed because the court found he labored under severe emotional stress at the time of the misconduct. In so doing, the
court recognized that "serious personal problems may be con'8 4
sidered in mitigation.
In Doyle and Gassman, as well as in In re Safran,8 5 the California Supreme Court employed a promising disciplinary measure-probation-as an additional protective device when
staying suspension from practice.8 6 This gradation in the disciplinary spectrum allows the court to take into account mitigat79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
sion is

66 Cal. 2d 680, 427 P.2d 164, 58 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1967).
Id. at 685, 427 P.2d at 167, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 567.
15 Cal. 3d 973, 544 P.2d 937, 126 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1976).
Id. at 978, 544 P.2d at 939, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
18 Cal. 3d 125, 553 P.2d 1147, 132 Cal. Rptr. 675 (1976).
Id. at 133, 553 P.2d at 1151, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
18 Cal. 3d 134, 554 P.2d 329, 133 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1976).
See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 43, at Standards 6.7, 6.8 (suspenconsidered a beneficial and preferred sanction).
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ing circumstances, but still imposes a meaningful public
protection sanction for an erring attorney who seems to have
overcome his mental difficulties or is functioning well under active therapeutic supervision. The Oregon Supreme Court also
used probation in two cases, In re Wheelock, 87 and In re
Ricketts. 88 In both of these cases, probation was imposed not to
punish the offenders, whose misconduct apparently resulted
from psychiatric problems, but to protect the public from the
risks of future professional misconduct.
Within those states advocating probation or other temporary disciplinary imposition, a common condition is that the attorney maintain a continuing program of psychiatric or other
therapeutic treatment. At least one state recognizing mental
disability (and alcoholism or drug dependency) as a potential
mitigating circumstance will regard failure to undertake or continue in treatment as an aggravating factor. 89 No reported cases
have attempted to restrict the type or volume of practice that an
attorney with a history of mental difficulty might engage in as an
alternate "public protection" technique. However, a recent
Texas decision, based upon a court-approved "letter of intention
and assurances," set aside a twelve-year-old disbarment and restored an attorney's license to practice in certain specified "narrow areas" of competence and experience: real estate, probate
(non-tax), uncontested family law cases, and lower court criminal cases. 90 This type of disposition, with its implicit recognition
and concern that an attorney stands as a potential public hazard
if he crosses a certain line in the bounds of his practice, is something that courts have been hesitant to acknowledge. It merits
close attention, and may enjoy some future application within
the new flexibility being accorded to disability dispositions.
To some extent, the question of moral turpitude in attorney
misconduct has determined the weight assigned to exonerating
circumstances, as has been evidenced by the California court
decisions. These cases have emphasized rather consistently
that the public protection policy behind lawyer discipline prohibits a total defense or excuse for conduct driven by mental or
emotional instability. However, such factors should, depending
on the seriousness of the offense, be relevant to the choice of
sanctions and extent of court supervision of future conduct.
87. 439 P.2d 872 (Ore. 1968).
88. 439 P.2d 873 (Ore. 1968).

89. Letter from R. W. Bachman, Administrative Director, Minnesota

Professional Responsibility Board to authors (September 12, 1978).
90. Rohlf v. Texas, No. F-240, 120 (Bexar County, Texas, April 19, 1978).
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CONCLUSION

The states are in substantial accord that to allow a mentally
incompetent attorney to practice law would endanger the legal
system and the public. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and at least thirty-two states' disciplinary rules call for
the suspension or transfer to inactive status of incompetent attorneys prior to commission of misconduct. These rules seem so
natural and essential that the law's previous lack of concern for
mental illness among attorneys is surprising and, in some ways,
even shocking. In the past, mentally ill attorneys unable to
properly serve clients were allowed to practice until their behavior became so obviously unprofessional or resulted in such serious harm that standard disciplinary proceedings could begin. In
other cases, attorneys whose mental illness was temporary were
permanently disbarred and thus denied the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, their legal careers destroyed because of one
unfortunate period of incapacity.
Most jurisdictions now accept current mental disability, at
least where classical psychosis or mental illness is involved, as a
bar or "defense" to disciplinary proceedings, and many seem increasingly willing to seek inactive enrollment or medical suspension as the proper discipline for an attorney whose serious
mental difficulties have led or contributed to actionable misconduct. This trend, however, has not involved an increase in the
few jurisdictions which accept mental impairment at the time of
misconduct as a full defense in disciplinary proceedings. Further progress toward acceptance of such a defense might or
might not be a salutary development. Nor are the underlying
concepts invulnerable to attack on philosophic grounds.
Critics of the insanity defense to criminal charges are numerous. Their criticism focuses primarily on the unreliability of
psychiatric testimony and the nebulous nature of insanity and
incompetence as concepts.9 1 These doubts apply equally in disciplinary proceedings. Additionally, these cases provide numerous examples which suggest how a lawyer whose affairs, both
professional and personal, are "falling apart" and who has engaged in unethical practice and been brought to account for his
misconduct, might readily generate expert psychiatric opinion
or argument about severe emotional difficulty or mental disor91. E.g., Weintraub, Remarks Before the Annual Judicial Conference of
the Second JudicialCircuit of the United States, 37 F.R.D. 365, 369-75 (1964);
State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 61-64, 152 A.2d 50, 74-77 (1959) (Weintraub, C.J.,
concurring). See also Szasz, The Insanity Pleaand the Insanity Verdict, 40
TEMP. L.Q. 271, 281-82 (1967); B. WOOTEN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAw chs.
2 & 3 (1963); B. WOOTEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY, ch. 8
(1959).
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der. The incapacity factor is frequently legitimately present in
these complex and multifaceted "professional crisis" situations;
hence, the observed close attention in many cases to differentiating between full-blown mental illness and less disabling personality, emotional and neurotic disorders.
The mental incapacity defense has its supporters too. Disability suspension or inactive status without the onus of adjudicated misconduct is readily available and accomplishes what
disbarment seeks to do. But, as many courts have pointed out,
while disbarment-or at least its stigma-is permanent, suspension allows for rehabilitation. Periodic judicial or bar association review of a suspended attorney's mental state seems to
require modest effort, and termination or suspension can be
coupled with retesting requirements or a period of probation
and supervision when practice resumes. 9 2 These techniques,
moreover, can assist in guaranteeing to clients a measure of protection from incompetent attorneys, while ensuring that cured
attorneys will be prohibited from practicing no longer than is
necessary.
The legal import of mental disability in disbarment proceedings remains uncertain. The need for preventive suspension
upon the finding of incompetence has been recognized, yet bar
associations and courts infrequently pursue this option. 93 As for
the incompetence defense to disbarment, many states continue
to ignore it, and even "enlightened" states continue to stress the
primacy of public protection over individual interest when their
courts and disciplinary apparatus disbar an attorney and ignore
mental illness as an exonerating factor in his serious misconduct. 94 Overall, however, a willingness to accept mental disability as at least a legitimate mitigating factor, as is proposed in the
new ABA Standards for Lawyer Disciplinary and Disability Proceedings, while leaving the door open for future restoration,
seems to be gaining ground.
Thirty years ago, most courts dismissed mental impairment
as an unacceptable excuse for unprofessional actions. Today,
even in a period of post-Watergate sensitivity to the "appear92. See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 1259, 1261 (1973) (comprehensive collection
of relevant cases indicate few decisions recognizing the insanity defense).
94. See, e.g., In re Abbott, 19 Cal. 3d 249, 561 P.2d 285, 137 Cal. Rptr. 195
(1977); Snyder v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 3d 286, 555 P.2d 1104, 133 Cal. Rptr. 864
(1976); Duggan v. State Bar, 17 Cal. 3d 416, 551 P.2d 19, 130 Cal. Rptr. 715
(1976). In these cases, the courts, faced with serious misconduct and claims
of mental illness in defense or exoneration, affirmed local disciplinary and
state board recommendations of disbarment while conceding mental illness
as a major causative factor. The theme was common, centering on the passage quoted at text accompanying note 80 supra.
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ance" of professional misconduct, courts and the law seem to
have grown increasingly sensitive to the dynamics behind and
distinctions between misconduct caused by mental disability
and that attributable to ethical dereliction and moral irresponsibility. They seek to keep mentally incompetent lawyers from
unsuspecting clients but, at the same time, avoid impenetrable
barriers against once-mentally ill lawyers who have proved
themselves again healthy and ready for the stresses and demands of professional practice. In theory at least, this offers an
optimal balance between the imperatives of public trust and
professional responsibility on the one hand and the right of professionally trained and accredited persons to pursue their calling when clearly able to do so on the other. Let us hope that
evolving legislation, rules, precedent and judicial/disciplinary
practice work to maintain, safeguard and add increasing precision to that balance.

